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Abtract: The simultaneous effect of two opposite tendencies is peculiar to the Ukrainian 
television as well as to most national media. Firstly, communication assumes more and 
more universal character due to expansion of the access to the media and because of 
the standard content. At the same time cultural, social and political distinctions of 
communications free themselves as the result of the media market’s influence. Both 
tendencies exhibit internal contradictions and counteractions. The obvious heterogeneity 
of viewer’s preferences opposes the total entertainment effect of the media reality and 
essential resistant potential of the Ukrainian audience as well as low level of trust 
in political media oppose total control over political preferences of the viewers. It 
would seem that the articulation of distinctions corresponds to the real life styles of 
population, but in fact it turns out to be a fixation of the traditionally established division 
into cultural competent and undemanding audiences, a strengthening of “mechanical” 
pluralism sanctioned by media business. The situation with the Ukrainian media is 
considered on the basis of the results of sociological researches conducted by the 
Institute of sociology of National Academy of sciences of Ukraine in 2000-2007.
Keywords: Sociocultural differentiation of audience; Political media; Content analysis of TV 
news
Resumo: Os efeitos simultâneos de duas tendências opostas são peculiares à televisão 
ucraniana, bem como para a maioria dos meios de comunicação nacionais. Em primeiro 
lugar, a comunicação assume mais e mais caráter universal, devido à expansão do 
acesso aos meios de comunicação social e à padronização do conteúdo. Ao mesmo 
tempo, distinções de comunicação cultural, social e política se libertam como resultado 
da influência da mídia no mercado. Ambas as tendências apresentam contradições 
internas e ações contrárias. A óbvia heterogeneidade das preferências do telespectador 
opõe o efeito do entretenimento total da realidade da mídia e o potencial de resistência 
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do público ucraniano, assim como o baixo grau de confiança nas mídias políticas opõe 
controle total sobre as preferências dos telespectadores. Pareceria que a articulação 
de  distinções  corresponde  ao  verdadeiro  estilo  de  vida  da  população,  mas,  na 
verdade, torna-se uma fixação da divisão tradicionalmente estabelecida entre públicos 
culturalmente competentes e não-demandantes, um reforço ao pluralismo “mecânico” 
estabelecido pela mídia empresarial. A situação da mídia ucraniana é considerada a 
partir dos resultados das pesquisas sociológicas realizadas pelo Instituto de Sociologia 
da Academia Nacional de Ciências da Ucrânia, entre 2000 e 2007.
Palavras-chave: Diferenciação sócio-cultural do público; Mídia política; Análise de conteúdo 
de Tv
The  statements  of  sociologists  concerning  the  influence  of  media 
on  society  and  social  communication  have  started  including  issues  of 
problematical character, ambivalence and paradoxes. The situation in Ukraine 
is no exception, which is confirmed yet again by political campaigns of the 
recent years, presidential and parliamentary elections. But media are not only 
politics. Nowadays they actually install the legitimating of social ontology: 
“to be is to be shown on TV” (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 25) or to be present, to have 
one’s place on the World Wide Web, which is true not only for celebrities but 
also for any events, phenomena, statuses and styles – past, present and future, 
global and local ones.
Opportunities and barriers
“Modern society approaches… a certain border beyond which nothing 
is uncommunicated, with the sole long-known exception – communication 
of sincerity” (Luhmann, 2005, p. 144). This statement of Niklas Luhmann 
is  rather  precise  in  pointing  out  indefinite  opportunities  and  unbeatable 
barriers of media systems which are now able to construct discourses on any 
subject not claiming to be absolute authentic but nevertheless not producing 
disappointing musings over the old deficit problem. Media researchers and 
social sciences theoreticians have already announced how to understand media 
and what to expect from them. The general formula is brought down to the 
acknowledgement of articulation of meaning character of social system as the 
most important function of media (Luhmann, 2001, p. 13), i. e. of senses of 
interactions of people, structures and states. 
Nowadays the permanently growing communication proposals from 
the old and the newest media can be actually realized only in part. At least 
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the selection of communications demands more and more actively special 
organization on mass and individual level and special regulation strategies and 
there will always be persons and institutions willing to take up this control. 
Secondly, the cultural anxiety over “sole reality” or so-called “objective 
reality” increases, with this reality losing self-evidence due to the attack of 
its numerous images in media and becoming more and more often the subject 
of “negotiations” and “agreements” striving to decide what is to be perceived 
as real (Willock, 2005). The first problem of communications choice makes 
topical the issue of publicity provided by media and in the end inspires political 
and management decisions. The second one returns us to the understanding of 
media communications nature. 
As for this nature, despite great variety of approaches to studying media 
the majority agree that by covering the events mass media construct a special 
world image, and the society has accumulated a lot of diverse claims to such 
construction. The main reason for criticism is in the greatly enhanced capability 
of telecommunications to simulate reality, not only representing it but canceling 
any borders between simulation and representation. Strictly speaking, the 
media does not answer the well-known question “whether territory precedes 
the map or the map precedes the territory” (Baudrillard, 1983). The sensitivity 
to distinguishing such borders diminishes among mass audiences, and the 
media market builds new strategies and projects on this defect. As a result, the 
deeply rooted worries of respectable criticism concerning the cameras defining 
reality as a show for masses and an object for control by ruling elite are still 
valid. We speak about the influences of new technologies on the deterioration 
of public taste and the control over electorate which is especially topical for 
Ukraine that is permanently in the state of political elections. The objections 
against such fears are based on important statements protecting spectator 
satisfaction, freedom or choice and resistance to apologetics, and the end to 
these debates cannot be seen. 
As in the most national media in Ukraine, two controversial tendencies 
are acting at the same time. 1) Communication gains a more universal character 
at the expense of better access to media and stereotypical content (only 6% 
of the Ukrainian population, who does not have a TV set, are not TV viewers, 
and the global culture imposes its standards in a more and more intensive 
way) (Kostenko, 2007a, p. 175). 2) At the same time, under the influence of 
media market cultural, social and political differences of communications are 
liberated. Both tendencies exhibit internal controversies and counteractions. 
The  obvious  heterogeneity  of  viewer’s  preferences  opposes  the  total 
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the Ukrainian audience as well as low level of trust in political media (at about 
30%) oppose total control over political preferences of the viewers (Panina, 
2005, p. 50). It would seem that the articulation of distinctions corresponds to 
the real life styles of population, but in fact it turns out to be a fixation of the 
traditionally established division into cultural competent and undemanding 
audiences, a strengthening of “mechanical” pluralism sanctioned by media 
business. This is how it looks like in empirical facts. 
Television control and social guardianship 
The  situation  in  the  field  of  media  consumption  does  not  exclude 
television control and social guardianship. According to the data of annual 
monitoring of Institute of Sociology “Ukrainian society”,1 the sympathies of 
Ukrainian audiences to television genres are rather stable and conservative. 
Just as three years ago, 70% prefer fiction films, two thirds prefer the news 
(up to 66%) and a half prefers entertainment and humoristic programs (up 
to 55%). If something did change, it is the progressing appeal of local TV 
series on Russian and Ukrainian television (from 27% to 34%) and also that of 
“realistic” programs – documentaries (from 14% to 28%) and “real television” 
(from 7% to 14%). Both supply and demand for these television products are 
growing, which actually corresponds to global tendencies. At the same time, 
the attention towards programs pretending to analyze current situations – as 
informational and analytical and criminal programs – rather reduces (Kostenko, 
2007b, p. 411).
Meanwhile, TV viewing preferences of citizens are actually differentiated 
according to habits and attitudes of spectator types (Figure1). Empirically, 
cluster analyses allow to determine seven such types, which include Minimalists 
(27%),  Empaths  (19%),  Athletes  (14%),  and  Observers  (11%)  located   
in  the  preferences  zone  of  “simple”  genres  and  constituting  in  total  ¾   
of  adult  audience,  and  also  Analysts  (13%),  Aesthetes  (10%)  and   
Perfectionists (6%), who prefer more “sophisticated” programs (Kostenko, 
2007b, p. 412-415). 
1  “Ukrainian Society” monitoring consists of annual sociological surveys conducted by the 
Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine since 1992. The 
sampling of each wave amounts to 1800 respondents on average and represents adult population 
of Ukraine (over 18 years of age). The survey results allow to observe and to analyze changes 
of social indices documenting the level of democratization of the Ukrainian society and the 
tendencies of socio-cultural development. The project is headed by V. Vorona, N. Panina, E. 
Golovakha (Panina, 2006, http://www.kar.net/~i-soc)40   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 1, p. 36-49, jan.-abr. 2009
Figure 1: Types of spectator preferences: 2007* 
(%, N=1800, monitoring “Ukrainian society”)
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* Correspondence analysis, Chi-square, the level of significance alpha 0,050
In  socio-cultural  space,  the  types  of  TV  program  preferences  are 
integrated into more generalized lifestyles, and their social geography is rather 
predictable in embodying intentions of traditional society and confirming 
explanations verified long ago (Figure 2): 
1)   the audiences on periphery are characterized by modest tastes and 
habitual or compensating consumption of television 
2)   competent middle-class public demonstrates an attitude for cultural 
consumption and possession of information 
3)   stable differentiation of “male-only” and “female-only” genres is 
supported both by peculiarities of their perceptions and the norms 
of femininity and masculinity cultivated in society. 
Such evident articulation of cultural differences on television seems 
to fully correspond to the idea of variety. But it is no less agreed with the 
practices of directed social herding by, for instance, extension of space for 
the so-called trash genres providing to modest audiences “simple solutions 
to difficult problems”, testing the boundaries of acceptable behavior and 
guarding marginal groups by providing a platform for talks about themselves 
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of political advertising, which has gained some popularity lately in Ukraine – 
anti-advertising checking the borders of public discourse and political culture 
of society. No doubt, by combining reality and imitation and turning news 
into entertainment resource and vice versa, television averages our tastes 
and pretensions. But at the same time it follows the imperatives of media 
market and carefully segments the audience into target groups which should 
be enclosed and protected for a precise hit. In this way the traditional cultural 
inequalities are reproduced and made legitimate: “empty” or “easy” genres 
stay a product for socially weak groups. 
Points-rows and points-columns (axis F1 and F2: 82 %)
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Figure 2: Styles of TV viewing in socio-cultural space: 2007*  
(%, N=1800, monitoring “Ukrainian society”)
* Correspondence analysis, Chi-square, the level of significance alpha 0,050
Political mobilization at the media market
In the field of political communication, the tendencies of media to unify 
content and audiences at the same time articulating political distinctions are 
especially evident during pre-election campaigns when television news turn 
into a ring of symbolic struggle for the benevolence of the electorate. In 
Ukraine, the news are regularly viewed by two thirds of adult population and 42   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 1, p. 36-49, jan.-abr. 2009
their political effect could have been significant but for the habitual attitude of 
Ukrainian audience to perceive media as a tool of influence from elite and acting 
authorities. According to the monitoring of “Ukrainian society” mentioned 
above media was always trusted less than the church and the army but more 
than the president, the government and political parties (Panina, 2005, p. 50). 
And the public has all reasons to believe this way as in TV news programs 
the field of Ukrainian politics is represented with significant deformations. 
Being a compromise among the influences of different controlling institutions 
– authorities, market, cultural and professional norms – the news will always 
stay interpretations of events which are presented in media as the events 
themselves. And the loyalty of such interpretations is usually directed to the 
side of the most influential political players. It is confirmed by the data of 
“Monitoring of political news” based on their content analysis and conducted 
since 2003 by the Ukrainian Press Academy together with the Institute of Socio- 
logy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine2 (News vs. News, 2005).
Let us call the unifying practice of news “a privilege of the strong”. 
As long-term observations show, the attention to different actors of politics 
is a certain and little changing value in TV news. On average, the attention 
to political institutions is present in ¾ of all messages about Ukraine, the 
attention to political personalities – in ⅔ of messages, the attention to political 
 
2    “Monitoring of political news” has been periodically conducted by Ukrainian Press Academy 
together with the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 
since 2003. The goal of research is to define the state and the dynamics of political content 
of the news on Ukrainian TV channels and the specifics of political advertising on television. 
The sample includes principal evening news programs on ten leading Ukrainian channels. 
The time frame of research is the first full week of each month. The sampling for each wave 
amounts to about 60 news programs (800 messages/90,000 seconds). The method used is 
content analysis of audiovisual information, it is conducted by trained operators according to 
a specially developed program (method reliability coefficient equals to 85-95% for different 
analysis categories).
  The main indices documented: 1) degree of balance in events interpretation (percentage of 
messages with only one/several viewpoints of the event in the general mass of messages);   
2) rating of attention to political actors/estimates of political actors (percentage of messages 
containing the names of political actors – institutions, political parties, persons/percentage of 
messages with positive, neutral, ironic, and negative evaluations of political actors); 3) access 
of politicians to news air (the volume of politician’s “direct speech” – time of speaking on air 
in seconds, percentage from the total volume of politicians’ “direct speech”); 4) types of news 
communication (documented empirically with the help of correspondence analysis depending on 
the degree of TV channels conjugation with the frequency of mentioning political actors, χ²). 
  Additional indices in content analysis political advertising include: advertising type (percentage 
with explicit/implicit advertising of political actors), share of anti-advertising (percentage 
of messages containing anti-advertising), images of political forces leaders (percentage of 
advertising messages mentioning leader’s qualities), social and political values in advertising 
(percentage of advertising messages mentioning values). The project is headed by N. Kostenko, 
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parties – in ⅓ of the news, i.e. “big politics” represented by the news is the 
politics of institutions and personalities while the presence of civic society 
structures in it is far less expressive (Kostenko, Ivanov, Makeyev, 2007, p. 72). 
Little is said about the choice among different ideologies or ways of country 
development. The attention of news towards the political platforms of parties 
and blocs is low even during the pre-election campaign (before extraordinary 
parliamentary election in September 2007 the political platforms were present 
in 8% of all news about Ukraine, and in August 2007 in 4% of all news) 
(Kostenko, Ivanov, Makeyev, 2007, p. 77). 
At the same time, the so-called “bonus of power”, i.e. increased attention 
to the first persons at the wheel is usually rather high, especially in the respect 
of president. Before the parliamentary elections of 2007 the popularity of 
President Viktor Yushchenko in the news exceeded the attention to any other 
politician by several times (30% of all messages about Ukraine) just as in 
December 2005 – March 2006 and can be compared with news popularity 
of President Leonid Kuchma in October 2003 – May 2004 not long before 
presidential elections (23%) and also of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych 
in July – November 2004, i.e. during the period of presidential pre-election 
campaign (28%). The rating of attention towards V. Yanukovych during the 
early parliamentary election in September 2007 amounted to 19%, Aleksandr 
Moroz – 10%, Yulia Timoshenko – 8%, Vladimir Litvin – 3%, that is, one can 
hardly speak about proportional representation of competing blocs leaders in 
the news (Kostenko, Ivanov, Makeyev, 2007, p. 82-84).
In general, the priority in attention rating during the whole pre-election 
campaign was on the side of pro-presidential bloc “Our Ukraine – People’s 
Self-Defense” representatives (35-37%). They were most often spoken of in 
the news practically on all leading Ukrainian TV channels, therefore stable 
unification of channel attention towards political forces is observed (Figure 3). 
We find another distribution in “direct speech”, the air time of direct quotes 
from politicians, which is the index of real access of political forces to the 
news (Figure 4). The leader in the volume of direct speech during the whole 
campaign was the Party of Regions (leading party of majority coalition in 
the Parliament of that period) (32-26%), which significantly overran other 
political forces (“Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense” – 33% in September 
2007, Yulia Timoshenko Bloc – 13%, Socialist Party of Ukraine – 13%), while 
the share of “direct speech” for the leading party stayed the same every month 
of campaign (Kostenko, Ivanov, Makeyev, 2007, p. 91-96). Therefore, the 
model of “dual power” was implemented in the following way: OU-PS was 
more often spoken of, and the Party of Regions more often spoke itself. 44   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 1, p. 36-49, jan.-abr. 2009
Figure 3: Distribution of attention to the representatives of  
political forces in the news: September 2007 
(N=1031 mentionings about politicians, 604 messages , “Monitoring of political news”)*
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Figure 4: Distribution of air time (“direct speech”) among the  
representatives of political forces in the news: September 2007 
(N=14004 seconds, 604 messages, “Monitoring of political news”)*
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If according to the rating of attention the channels mostly had standardized 
positions, they were very different in the case of “direct speech”, and here the 
second tendency in news practices can be demonstrated, which is political 
mobilization on the media market. The differentiation is understandable as 
direct speech of a politician on air has a valuable price – time – and it cannot 
be given away thoughtlessly or accidentally. The results of news content 
analysis document the tendencies of channels belonging to different media 
holdings to unevenly distribute “direct speech” among the representatives of 
different political forces. In August 2007 Ukrainian channels TRC Ukraina, 
NTN and Inter did it in favor of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party 
of Ukraine, Noviy Kanal, ICTV, STB – in favor of “Our Ukraine – People’s 
Self-Defense” and Socialist Party of Ukraine, 1+1 Channel most often gave 
word to Litvin Bloc and representatives of Yulia Timoshenko Bloc (as ICTV 
channel), UT-1 and Tonis – to the representatives of small parties, 5 Kanal –   
to the majority of political forces (Figure 5) (Kostenko, Ivanov, Makeyev, 
2007, p. 97).
Figure 5: Channel preferences in allocating air time to the  
representatives of different political forces: August 2007 
(N=552 messages, 6897 seconds of direct speech , “Monitoring of political news”)*
* Correspondence analysis, Chi-square, the level of significance alpha 0,050
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The cooperation of political elites and media business is demonstrated 
in pre-election advertising where it is cemented by no means symbolic capital 
but the strong financial interest. The main feature of advertising flow of the 
last parliamentary campaign is the unprecedented share of anti-advertising. If 
in March 2006 anti-advertising of candidates was in every tenth advertising 
message of television prime time (11%) and occupied a half of air time allocated 
for advertising (49%), in September 2007 it was respectively in every second 
message (47%) or occupied 70% of advertising air time (Kostenko, Ivanov, 
Makeyev, 2007, p. 27-39).
It is not a secret that each influential political force in Ukraine has its own 
or sympathizing media resources. The space of media business is therefore 
combined with the politics space communicating general energy of the market 
and severe competition to the latter. Currently rather pluralistic image of media 
political content is created, but it is not as much due to liberal principles of 
independent press as according to the interests of owners. Therefore, we speak 
mostly of mechanical pluralism, which can be achieved by effectuating a 
complicated operation with news “puzzles”.
The spectator is rather on the winning side but only in case he or she has 
the opportunity to watch news on all channels simultaneously. Those categories 
of citizens who got used to watch “their favorite channel” are hardly apt to do 
it. No doubt, this kind of plurality extends the horizons of politically possible. 
Nevertheless, two of its projections are well known. One of them, associated 
with sense strengthening of variety and distinctions, as a rule stays a desirable 
future. The other one, usually more real, promises to get rid of discomfort 
due to discrepancies of political commentaries in the media with the help of 
state mechanisms or wishes of owners to monopolize media space. Naturally, 
the state of political communication in Ukraine is more or less typical for 
transforming societies where it is most often not possible to create a fertile 
or at least an acceptable public discourse with the help of media (Pankov, 
Gochazh, 2004; Zorkaya, 2005). Ukrainian TV is not hurrying to present its 
own initiative in this aspect.    
Unexpressive alternative
Internet is seen as an alternative to television; the use of the former 
becomes more and more popular among educated and young electorate. 
However,  the  paradox  of  the  Internet  as  evident  discrepancy  between   
the  idea  of  effective  informational  exchange,  virtual  democracy,  direct   
cultural participation, all other known advantages of “informational society” 
and actually practiced stimulation of social inequalities is stable even in   47     N. Kostenko – Television as total practices and liberalization of distinctions 
those  European  countries,  which  are  significantly  developed  in  this   
respect. 
The Ukrainian example also possesses numerous inadequacies of media 
power and distortions of the public sphere. The interest of the Ukrainian 
audience in politics caused by extraordinary political events of the recent 
years is rather high in comparison with other transforming European countries 
and matches the interest in politics in the developed states. In Ukraine 64% of 
respondents are interested in politics, while there are 45% of those interested in 
Europe in total (Golovakha, Gorbachik, Panina, 2006, p. 11). Meanwhile, public 
communication is provided in Ukraine by the inclusion of population in the 
“old” media (television, radio and press) while the usage of new informational 
systems is still unprecedentally low on the European scale. According to the 
data of European social survey of 20053 in developed Scandinavian countries 
Internet is used by more than two thirds of adult audience, in former socialist 
countries this number amounts to one third, and in the countries of European 
south it amounts to one fifth. Ukraine, where only one tenth of citizens use the 
Internet, does not join to general European picture, and even the elite cannot be 
viewed as a leader of electronic competence (Kostenko, 2007a, p. 183-188).
In Ukraine even the youth has the lowest indices of Internet use (Figure 
6). While in Slovakia and Hungary a half, and in Poland and Slovakia a third 
of the youth can be considered its regular users, 80% of Ukrainian audience 
under 30 are practically isolated from the alternative information system 
and become vulnerable for the influence of more unified and stereotyped 
information of TV and radio channels (Kostenko, 2007a, p. 189). Similar 
disproportions point to strong dependence of transformational processes in 
Ukraine on initial conditions in comparison with post-socialist countries when 
relatively inexpressive differences in starting position may bring significant 
discrepancies in results. In modern chaos theories such dependence has a 
beautiful name of “butterfly effect”, and if we apply it to Ukrainian society, 
this butterfly flapped its wings in the last century. 
3  “European Social Survey” (ESS) is an all-European monitoring project with the participation 
of over 20 countries including Ukraine (since 2005). The project is headed by Roger Jowell. 
In Ukraine, the survey was conducted according to national random sample (2000 respondents 
surveyed) in March and April 2005 by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy 
of Sciences of Ukraine and was directed by E. Golovakha, A. Gorbachik and N. Panina 
(Golovakha, Gorbachik, Panina, 2007, Ukrainian Society in a European Dimension, 2007, 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)48   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 1, p. 36-49, jan.-abr. 2009
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